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/Tj he revolution in science now requires thoughtful 
political change, not piecemeal and temporizing 
adjustments. If we delay too long . .. , the science 
establishment might become an acute threat rather than 
a rich benefit to our democratic system. An enlargement 
of individual freedom ... is more likely to be produced 
through the rational ordering of scientific activity than 
through maintaining its subsidized disorder. It took 
almost a century to learn this lesson and to devise 
flexible controls over our economic activity. Let us hope 
that the lead-time will be greatly reduced when we come 
to experiment with effective political controls over the 
nation's scientific and technological assets. 
-Waller Goldslein. The Science Establishment and its Political Control, 
43 Virginia Quarterly Review. 353, 371 (1967) 
The Coaxial Wiretap: Privacy and the Cable 
Someday we may be shopping, banking, taking 
medical examinations and reading over cable television. 
Terminals will be installed in every living room, just as 
telephones and televisions are today. The cable will have 
two-way capability that means while you are watching 
the hockey game, your TV set may be keeping track of 
you. The cable system manufacturers' boasts are 
ominous: "[I] t is essential that it be kept in mind that 
the TOCOM (cable TV) system ... does have the 
capability of interrogating literally any information at 
remote points and transmitting this information back to 
a Central Data Terminal." 1 As the advertising literature 
for this new system points out, its computer "is 
programmed to determine if the TV Receiver is on or off 
and what channel has been selected." 2 
The use of technology to invade privacy is not new, of 
course. Cable TV, in fact, will simply be the latest in an 
array of implements which rob us of our right to be 
solitary. The average American is the subject of 10 to 20 
dossiers in government and private files. 3 Files are 
maintained by the Justice Department (including the 
FBI), the Army, Internal Revenue Service, Passport 
Division, Social Security Administration, state and local 
police, welfare agencies, motor vehicle departments, and 
credit bureaus. 4 The Association of Credit Bureaus alone 
keeps I OS million dossiers 5-thus accounting for at least 
half the American population. 
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(T] he Army maintains files on the membership, ideology, 
~rogram, and l'ractices of virtually every activist political group 
m the country. These include not only such violence prone 
organizations as the Minutemen and the Revolutionary Action 
Movement (RAM), but such non-violent groups as the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference, Clergy and Laymen United 
Against the War in Vietnam, the American Civil Liberties Union, 
Women Strike for Peace, and the National Association for the 
Advancement Colored People.• 
In lllinois even Senator (then candidate) Adlai Stevenson 
III and Congressman Abner Mikva were watched. 7 
When you make a reservation on American Airlines it 
is recorded on a computer so that a seat will be held f~r 
you. According to a magazine report on the airline's 
system: "American's computer can be queried about any 
traveler's movement in the last two or three 
months ... 10 to 15 investigators a day (Federal, state, 
local and other) are permitted to delve into the 
computer for such information." 8 Thus investigators can 
and do determine who sat next to you and with whom 
you stayed in each city of departure (you leave a contact 
telephone number with the airlines). Similar informa-
tion may be revealed by the computer which keeps track 
of your credit card purchases. 
Computers and other technological developments have 
contributed substantially to the snoopers' standards of 
living. But the secret police must be holding their 
collective breath for cable television. 
The TOCOM cable system described above can 
interrogate up to 180,000 home televisions in 30 seconds. 
Then, according to its manufacturer, "based upon 
information received from the Remote Transmitter 
Receivers, we can automatically alert the police 
department." "(SJ ince we can determine who is turned 
to what channel ... If customer 741 in Group I turns 
on his switch and turns to Channel 13 ... at 10:30 in 
the morning then we will know within 30 seconds of 
when he turns his set on ... and likewise we will know 
within 30 seconds of when he changed to a different 
channel." "For the future of the system, with very little 
modification," the same manufacturer says, "we see the 
capability of ... the control of devices at remote 
locations ... we may in one condition disable every 
remote home transmitter receiver throughout the 
system; ... or we can, by transmitting an identification 
c?de, along with a separate code, selectively enable or 
disable each respective remote transmitter unit." 9 
This future is no.t very far away. The president of 
K'Son Corp., an electronics firm in Fullerton California 
recently wrote about a new piece of equipme~t of which 
he is very proud: 
It automatically responds to interrogations from the· head-end 
with information on what channel is being watched and when. 
Also it has the built-in capability of being turned on and off 
from the head-end by the transmission of a unique code. •0 
A simiiar unit is currently being used experimentally on 
the Sterling (Time-Life) cable system on the southern 
portion of Manhattan. Sterling's computer can 
determine whether or not an identified television set is 
on and to which channel it is tuned. 11 Tokyo's Takanaw 
Prince Hotel uses its cable TV system to monitor the 
missing contents of room refrigerators, thus simplifying 
its billing procedures. 12 Not long ago, President Nixon 
suggested a civil defense warning system that would 
automatically turn on every radio and television in the 
nation and, of course, tune them to the same emergency 
message. He did not say what might constitute an 
"emergency." 
Viewers of the experimental cable system in 
Dennisport, Massachusetts, select programs by dialing on 
an instrument similar to a telephone. Each dial moves a 
mechauical switch in the central office and anyone 
sitting in that office can see exactly to which channel 
every set is tuned and whether or not each set is on. 
Furthermore, there is no safeguard against a person in 
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the central office moving the mechanical switches until 
each set is tuned to the channel he has chosen. 13 
Cable television 11,1ay become the method of distribu-
tion for library books, newspapers a'nd news magazines 
within 20 years. 14 One of the simplest things for a cable 
system to record will be the names of books and 
periodicals each household has requested. Similarly, a 
system could monitor political speeches watched. 
Senator Samue! J. Ervin has recently warned: 
When people fear surveillance, whether it exists or not, when 
they grow afraid to speak their minds and hearts freely to their 
Government or to anyone else, then we shall cease to be a free· 
society. 15 
"The right to be let alone," echoed Justice Douglas, "is 
indeed the beginning of all freedom." 16 Each individual 
has, in the words of the Restatement of Torts, a 
protected "interest irt not having his affairs known to 
others." 17 Canadian Justice John Turner explains the 
problem clearly: 
"The right to dissent becomes a very difficult right to maintain if 
there aren't those areas in which one can discuss without the fear 
of being overheard. A democratic policy depends on a lot of 
confidential relationships, conversations, the ability to muster 
support in private, and so on."'" 
Surveillance, or the threat of surveillance, makes men 
circumspect. Citizens engaged in unpopular activities are 
especially vulnerable. In fact, FBI surveillance has been 
used in the hope of producing a chilling effect on 
dissenter activity. FBI agents, for example, received 
instructions to increase the frequency of interviews of 
New Left members because "it will enhance the paranoia 
endemic in these circles and will further serve to get the 
point across that there is an FBI agent behind every 
mailbox." 19 
It was not very long ago that I. F. Stone was 
explaining to his readers: · 
Since you never know what organization may some day be 
regarded as suspect, better join none. Since almost any cause 
may sonie day be regarded as subversive, better keep away from 
all. Since there are now informers everywhere, including the 
campus, say as little as possible, avoid the discussion of 
dangerous subjects. Be careful what books you .have in your 
library and what publications you read. These may be held 
against you. 20 
Stone went on to report instances of government 
excesses. McCarthy's famous list of subversives included 
a man in whose raincoat pocket were found Russian 
lessons and a man who had signed a "radical" petition. A 
woman was held up to public ridicule for buying one 
copy of the Daily Worker. An economist died in the 
midst of deportation proceedings brought because he 
was on a 31-year old Communist membership list. "A 
man who had once worked for Amtorg, with two sisters 
in Russia, whose name had been on the mailing list of 
several 'front' organizations during the war would never 
be freshly hired." Men were refused military commis-
sions because their mothers had once belonged to the 
Communist Party. HUAC kept up-to-date a Guide to 
Subversive Organizations and Publications for one's 
reading guidance. "Aliens found themselves deported; 
foreign-born citizens, denaturalized; citizens, bl<fcklisted, 
on the basis of allegations which often included the 
reading of the Daily Worker." 21 
New York Civil Liberties Union attorney Burt 
Neuborne recently summed it up: "The tone of 
spontaneity of spirit that characterizes a free society 
cannot survive in an atmosphere where all deviations 
from the norm are immediately noted by the state and 
stored for future reference." 22 
Fortunately, there is some legal support for that 
position. 23 "Privacy", Justice Douglas has written, 
"though not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, is 
essential to the exercise of other rights guaranteed by 
it." 24 
Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut spelled 
out the Constitutional theorv behind the right of 
privacy: 
IT] he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is 
protected from governmental intrusion .... The right of 
"association" like the right of belief [citation omitted[ is more 
than the right to attend a meeting; it includes the right to 
express one's attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group 
or by affiliation with it or by other lawful means. Association in 
that context is a form of expression of opinion; and while it is 
not expressly included in the First Amendment its existence is 
necessary in making the express guarantees fully mean-
ingful. ... Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right 
of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amend-
ment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its 
prohibition against th.e quartering of soldiers "in any house" in 
time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet 
of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 
"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The 
Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the 
citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not 
force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment 
provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people .... The Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
were described in Boyd v. United States as protection against all 
governmental invasions "of the sanctity of a man's home and the 
privacies of life." 25 
Just how far this Constitutional right of privacy can 
be carried in still a subject of hot judicial dispute. 26 It is 
said, for example, that the federal right of privacy is left 
to the states to protect, along with the protection of 
safety and property. 27 
Wire tapping-which presumably would include 
interception of pictures, of orders placed, or of programs 
billed on cable, though the question has never been 
raised judicially 28 -is restricted by the Communications 
Act of 1934. 29 Furthermore, conversation is protected 
by the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable seizure 
even where there is no physical trespass. 30 In fact, 
damages are recoverable. 31 The Communications Act 
even prohibits the mere registration of numbers called 
where there is no recording of conversation. 32 In 
addition, harrassment by means of persistent and 
unwanted telephone calls has been held to be an 
actionable invasion of privacy. 33 
But the President may authorize a tap in the interests 
of "national security," 34 and a judge may do so under a 
wide variety of circumstances. 35 
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Apart from the restrictions against wiretapping, there 
is a body of law restricting visual surveillance by any 
means electronic, mechanical or in person. 36 But the 
doctrine is hedged by the necessity to prove actual 
damages 37 and to prove an obtrusive invasion that 
would be offensive to a person of ordinary sensi-
bilities. 38 Thus, if the federal and/or state wiretap 
statutes do not apply to cable-tapping, 39 the present 
eavesdropping law barely deals with the problem. 
The legal protections which do exist have not been a 
terribly effective shield against invasions of privacy, 
especially by governments. 40 There is no reason to 
believe present law will work any better after the 
introduction of two-way cable television. 
With two-way cable TV so close on the horizon, 41 it 
.is surprising and disappointing that so little attention has 
been paid to the privacy issue. The Illinois Commerce 
Commission, for example, held extensive hearings on 
cable television last spring. The Commission heard from 
three highly qualified engineers, its own very able and 
public-spirited technical consultant, and representatives 
from two of the most substantial cable TV equipment 
manufacturers. It also received extensive testimony from 
four scholars of law and communication. None of these 
people presented information relating to the protection 
of privacy. Of those cross-examined, not one had given 
any serious thought to the problem. 42 
Similarly, the Federal Communications Commission 
has not formally considered the protection of privacy on 
cable TV, although it has received information on the 
subject. 43 
The worst record is at the municipal level-where most 
of the regulation of cable television currently takes 
place. 44 In Chicago, for example, Alderman Paul T. 
Wigoda held four days of hearings on cable regulation, 
during which he heard from one engineer (who merely 
offered his services and sat down), no manufacturers and 
scholars." 45 Other cities have not even had hearings. 46 
Agencies such as the American Civil Liberties Union 
are overburdened. ACLU is pressing its battle against 
political surveillance, 47 but few people, if anyone 
outside the FBI, are paying attention yet to cable TV as 
an instrument of that surveillance. 
Yet there are some reasonably simple technological 
protections available. For example, under questioning 
before the Illinois Commerce Commission, one 
manufacturer (who had not thought about the problem 
before) estimated that one-fourth of a system couJ.d be 
effectively set aside and made relatively private for an 
increase in construction cost for the entire system of 
about 7% 48 -an addition of perhaps 70 cents to a 
$10.00 monthly charge. The technology for this is 
reasonably simple. For example, Gulf-Western Industries 
has a scrambling system (used also for Pay-TV) which 
costs $25.00 per unit to manufacture. 49 For even less, a 
cable operator can install a light and bell which will 
notify the subscriber when his television is being 
monitored to determine which channel is being tuned. A 
switch to prevent such monitoring is also inexpensive. 
The lllinois Commerce Commission is proposing to 
require both devices. so It may even be feasible to 
construct an inexpensive home device which would 
detect most, if not all, taps of telephone or cable lines. 
In fact, according to the Electronic Industries 
Association, the electronic manufacturers' trade group, a 
cable "network ... can enjoy any desired degree of 
privacy that. can be· economically justified." st 
However, whatever a clever engineer can devise to 
protect privacy on the cable, an equally clever engineer 
can undo. Thus, at best, you are guaranteed of being 
monitored (i.e., surveyed as to channel watched, cassette 
requested, etc.) and tapped (overheard) on the cable 
only by professionals. Perhaps that is better than no 
privacy at all. Yet, in the long run it may be the 
"professionals" who concern us most of all. 
Certainly, if a portion of the cable spectrum is 
reserved, by statute or ordinance, for private communi-
cations, then scrambling devices of relatively high 
sophistication should be installed on these channels. In 
addition, locks and armored cable should be installed to 
deter access to terminal boards and cable drops from 
pole to house and within the house. Anyone who has 
prowled around in basements knows how easy it is to 
tap into a naked telephone line strung along the beams 
in the cellar below an apartment or office building. si 
Technological solutions of this character are feasible if 
they are built into the system when the system is , 
constructed, but they are worthwhile only if methods 
for circumventing them ;ue not built into the system or 
added later. Legislation is clearly in order, since there is 
little incentive to the operator either to include such 
solutions in the cable system or to prevent their 
circumvention. 
While legally required technological protections will 
discourage monitoring and tapping, they should be 
supplemented with purely legal protections. For one 
thing, disclosure of information obtained via cable could 
be forbidden or allowed only after notice and opportun-
ity to refuse consent. s3 No disclosure would be 
permissible except with express consent (which might 
even be bought, as, for example, by audience rating 
services). Consent would preferably be required at each 
occasion (simply a matter of pushing a button on a 
two-way cable set) and in either case should not be made 
a condition of subscribing to a cable service. Minimum 
mandatory penalties should lie high 54 and enforceable 
either by the District Attorney, the FCC or the injured 
individual. Indeed, new rights of action should be 
specifically established-invasion of privacy by 
unauthorized monitoring or tapping of a cable. 
One problem in enforcing such a right is detecting 
when information is being obtained from the cable. In 
the case of monitoring, detection is relatively simple 
since an interrogating signal must be sent to the set. Taps 
285 
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of the cable. on the other hand. arc extremely difficult 
to detect. since tapping merely deflects a minute 
proportion of the transmitted signal. Only very 
expensive, sophisticated equipment can detect the 
presence of the tap. Because of this, tapping can 
probably only be eliminated by rigorous policing, a 
function which can be performed most efficiently by the 
operator of the system himself. 
The operator of any cable system must maintain the 
physical security of the cable to insure adequate service 
to subscribers; he therefore is in a position to provide at 
least coarse physical surveillance against taps. Further-
more, to prevent pirating of his own signal the operator 
will have to install sophisticated electronic gear to detect 
any loss of signal due to unauthorized connection of 
additional sets to a cable terminal in a h9me. It is an 
easy additional function to attune such equipment to 
detecting taps which invade the privacy of the sub-
scriber. 
To encourage operators to do this policing, it might be 
appropriate to reward him for each tap he detects. To 
increase incentive, the operator could be strictly liable in 
tort to all persons whose communications are monitored 
or tapped. High mandatory punitive damages assessable 
no matter what the actual damages could be included 
under such liability. 
The telephone company apparently cares little 
whether its lines are tapped. In fact, it cannot even get 
excited about unauthorized use of telephone credit 
cards. Obviously, Bell has no economic incen live to 
worry about the right of its subscribers to privacy. With 
sufficient incentive, Bell could be quite efficient about 
smoking out taps on its lines. 
There is no reason why telephone subscribers should 
not be protected in a similar way. But such protection 
may be more important in the case of cable. First, the 
cable subscriber may come to rely on his new instrument 
for functions which his telephone cannot perform. Most 
people, for instance, prefer their medical examinations 
and banking transactions to be maintained in utter 
secrecy. And few relish the thought of a government 
agency having ready access to a list of a person's reading 
material. Cable TV will make these and other functions 
terribly more convenient to the subscriber, since cable 
will supply visual as well as audio information. 
Secondly, in comparison with the telephone, cable 
provides a significant increase in convenience to those 
who want to tap the cable. For instance, in a number of 
applications of two-way cable, information will be 
solicited from all subscribers at one time; telephone 
inquiries, on the other hand, are singular and occur at 
random intervals. 55 Furthermore, due to the nature of 
the wiring and switching systems employed with cable, 
and the fact that most cable messages will contain an 
identifying code, large scale tapping on major cable 
trunk lines will be far easier than in the case of the 
telephone. These factors alone provide the "tapper" 
with a previously unknown efficiency, increasing 
significantly the likelihood of invasions of privacy via 
cable. 
Since most of tomorrow's cable systems are not yet 
built, especially in the bigger cities, it is relatively easy 
now to build in protections of privacy such as scramblers 
and warning signals. It is possible to add these safeguards 
later-as it is theoretically possible to add similar 
protection to the telephone system-but it is more 
expensive in both technological and political costs. 
There is no reason to think that the government will act 
any differently about the cable than telephone lines. 
The social benefits of two-way cable television could 
be immense, just as the telephone has been a great boon. 
But-just as with the telephone-cable TV will open vast 
new opportunities for privacy invasion. 
Certainly there is no technological way to prevent all 
such invasions. And legal prevention depends in the last 
analysis on enforcement of existing law. Therefore, my 
parting word is Jefferson's: vigilance. Not only must we 
act now to protect the security of our private thoughts 
and lives against the curiosity, suspicion and paranoia of 
our government and our neighbors. But, even having 
acted, we must not assume that the problem is solved. 
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1. W. F. Osborn (CAS Manufacturing Co., Irving, Texas), 
TOCOM System, paper presented to National Cable Television 
Assoc. 14, (July, 1971). 
2. CAS Manufacturing Co. brochure, undated (approx. June, 
1971). 
3. Prof. Arthur Miller (University of Michigan), Hearings before 
Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (Senator Erwin, 
Chairman), March, 1971, reported in press. 
4. Id. 
5. R. Nader, The Dossier Invades the Home, Saturday Review 
18 (April 17, 1971). 
6. C. Pyle, CONUS Intelligence, Washington Monthly 4 
(January, 1970). 
7. Interview with John O'Brien, former Army intelligence 
officer (February, 1971). 
8. Star, The Computer Data Bank, Look 27 (June 25, 1968). 
9. Osborn, supra at 3, 4, 11, 2, 7. 
10. Cable News 3 (February 12, 1971). 
11. Cable News 22 (March 19, 1971 ). 
12. Wired Hotel in Tokyo in Japan Electronic Industry 52 (May, 
1971). 
13. Personal observation, Sept., 1970. At least the sets cannot 
be turned on from the central office. 
14. For example, Chicago Tribune Editor Clayton Kirkpatrick 
recently wrote that he thinks that the newspaper "might 
eventually be reproduced on screens which could be r~ad in the 
home. There might be provisions for reproducing portions of 
news which might appear on the screen through an instant 
facsimile process so that any part of the written record could be 
taken off the screen for study, filing for future reference, or. 
passed on to others who might share the same interest." Big City 
Newspaper, Chicago Tribune Educational Services Dept. (1971). 
15. The Progressive, 23 (June, 1971). 
16. Dissenting in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollack, 343 
US 451at467 (1952). ''The makers of our Constitution ... con-
ferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the 
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized man." Brandeis dissenting in Olmstead v. US, 277 US 
438, 478 (1928). 
17. Restatement, Torts (1939) Sec. 867. Quoted with approval, 
see, e.g. Afro-American Pub. Co. v. Jaffee, 366 F. 2d 649, 653; 
Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255 NE2d 765, 769 (1970). 
18. Canadian Department of Communications, Telecommunica-
tions Study 5(b). Conference Report-Computers: Privacy and 
Freedom of Information (l 971 ). 
19. See, e.g., Saturday Review 24 (April 17, 1971). 
20. l.F. Stone's Weekly, (January 24, 1955) in Stone, The 
Haunted Fifties (l 963, paperback ed. 1969) at 74. 
21. Id. at 26-33, 75-86, 253. 
22. Constitutional Rights Hean·ngs, supra at note 3. 
23. A more thorough treatment of the subject of privacy will be 
found in e.g., W. Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971) sec. 117; R. 
Pound, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Right of Privacy, 
13 W. Res. L.R. 34 (196l);Restatement, Torts (1939), sec. 867. 
24. Douglas dissenting in Osborn v. US, 385 US 323 (1966). 
25. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 4 79 at 483 (1965). 
26. A considerable volume of privacy law is derived from the 
Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Wolfv. Colorado, 338 US 25 
(1949);Berxerv. New York, 388 US41 (1961);Stanfordv. 
Texas, 379 US 476 (1965); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 US 
523 (1963). Expression is protected from search and seizure. 
Marcus v. Search Wa"ants of Property. 367 US 717. 
27. US v. Katz, 389 US 341;Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 US 374 
(1967). ' 
28. 4 7 USC 605 prohibits unauthorized reception of "any ... 
communication by radio" (except general broadcasts) if · 
information gained thereby is used or divulged improperly. 
Interception of wire communications is not explicitly prohibit-
ed, although divulging the contents of a "communication by 
wire or radio" is restricted. See also 18 USC 2511. Is cable 
television communication by wire or communication by radio? 
29. 43 USC sec 605 0934). Several states also prohibit most 
electronic eavesdropping. See e.g., Cal Pen Code 653-j, 111 Rev 
Stat c. 38 secs 14-1 to 14-7 ( 1969), Md Ann Code, Art 27 sec 
125A (1957), Mass Gen Laws c. 272 sec 99. 
30. Berxer V. NY, supra, at note 26. 
31. Rhodes JI. Graham, 238 KY 225, 37 Sw2d 46 (1931) (no 
statute). 18 USC sec 2050 permits punitive and actual damages 
as well as costs. Actual damages are liquidated at $100 per day, 
minimum $1000. 
32. US v. Dote, 371 F2d 176 (7th Cir 1966), US v. Caplan, 255 
F Supp 805 (D Mich 1966); contra US v. Gallo, 123 F2d 229 
(2dCir 1941). 
33. Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St 35, 133 NE 2d 140 (1956), affg 
99 Ohio App 485, 135 NE2d 440 (I 955), Harms JI. Miami Daily 
News Inc, 127 So 2d 715 (Fla 1961), Casey v. Statewide Finance 
Co. 3 Conn. C.C. 716, 223 A 2d 405 (1966). 
34. 18 USC sec 2511 (3). 
35 18 use sec 2511 (a). 
36. co. Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, 88 So 2d 716 (La App 
1956) (physical trespass and "Peeping Tom" statute), Ga Code 
sec 26-2001 et seq. (Peeping Tom statute), Schultz v. Frankfort 
M. Acc. & P. G. Ins. Co., 151 Wis 537, 139 NW 386 (1913), 
Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 NY2d 560, 307 NYS2d 647, 
255 NE2d 765 (1970). 
37. dd. Hamberxer V Eastman, 1076 NH 107, 206 A2d 239, 
(1964). 
38. ee. Id.; Nader v. General Motors Corp. supra, Tucker v. 
American Employers' ins. Co., 171So2d437, 13ALR3d1020 
(Fla App 1965), Forster v. Manchester, 410 Pa 192, 189 A 2d 
147 (1963), Restatement, Torts (1939), sec. 867; Prosser, Torts 
(4th ed. 1970) sec 117 at p 808. 
39. For example, the Illinois statute prohibits using a· device to 
"hear or record oral conversation" and arguably does not deal 
with pictures. Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 38 sec 14-l. 
40. See also, e.g., A. Westin, Science, Privacy and Freedom, 66 
Col. L. Rev.1003 (1966), F. J. Donner, E. Cerruti, The Grand 
Jury Network, 214 The Nation 5 (1972). · 
41. Irving Kahn, former President of TelePrompTer Corp. 
(largest US cable operator), predicts four years from now. Oral 
remarks, Beardsley Ruml Colloquium, University of Chicago, 
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February 27, 1971. Leon Papernow, executive vice-president of 
Cypress Communications, suggests two years. Look, Sept. 6, 
1971atp66. 
42. Docket No. 56191 Proposed rule (January, 1972). The 
transcript is about 2800 pages long, excluding exhibits. 
43. See, e.g., Comment to Federal Communications Commission 
in Docket No. 18397, October 27, 1969, Part V, p. 17. Docket 
56191, Proposed Rule Making, Jan. 1972. 
44. Only ten statei.have ANY state regulation. Genl. Statutes of 
Conn., c. 289 secs 16-330 to 16-333 (1963), Conn. Public Act 
No 175 (1865); Laws of Del. v. 58 c. 301 (1971) (public utility 
tax); Hawaii Act I 07 ( 1970); Illinois Commerce Commission, 
Docket 56191, Interim Opinion and Order (1971), appeals 
pending sub nom Cable Television Co. of lllinois v. lllinois 
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